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Abstract 
This paper sets out to explore the relationship between technology and health. 
Part One of the paper uses the history of penicillin to demonstrate how the complex 
processes involved in getting a new technology to market are at least as important as the 
technology itself. Penicillin went through three stages: discovery, development and 
distribution – each crucial to the drug’s success. The discovery of the technology would 
have been useless without effective systems for both turning it into a usable package and 
ensuring that doctors and their patients could gain access to it. 
Part Two expands the idea that technology alone has little impact on health. The 20
th 
century struggle against tuberculosis (TB) highlights the part society can play in improving 
its health. Knowledge of the causes of TB helped people to mobilize against the disease, 
with impressive results. The discovery of a vaccine reinforced society’s efforts and was 
instrumental in driving the disease down to vanishingly small levels, but it also led to public 
complacency and the latter part of the century saw TB on the rise again.  
The third section of the paper shows how society’s efforts to improve health must be 
backed up by governments. Contrasting results in the global battle against HIV/AIDS 
highlight the importance of strategic government action directed at making the best use of 
technology. Governments have a vital role to play both in steering the development of new 
technologies and facilitating their use. Again, technology by itself will not solve health 
problems – its interaction with all levels of society is the key to its success. 
Part Four of the paper delves further into the idea that governments must take a strategic 
view on technology. It examines the potential of public/private partnerships for developing 
technology, as well the scope for new technologies such as information technology and the 
internet for empowering people to take control of their health. 
The paper concludes that, although technology has had some astonishing successes in the 
last 100 years, these achievements have been facilitated by society’s use of them. The 
concept of “social technology” places technology at the center of the myriad of social forces 
that mediate its use. The advances created by technology, it argues, “can truly be 
transformative – it is the job of ‘social technology’ to make sure that they are.”  
 
   4 
One  Lessons from the past 
All to gain, nothing to lose 
On 17 January 1941, Mrs. Elva Akers, a 50 year-old woman with terminal breast cancer, 
was given 100 mg of penicillin. She was the first person ever to be given a purified version 
of the new antibiotic. After the injection, intended to establish whether the drug was toxic to 
humans, Mrs. Akers “at once said she had a curious musty taste in her mouth, but 
otherwise suffered no harm.” (Fletcher, 1984). As a result, the drug was declared ready for 
its first therapeutic test. 
Penicillin research team member Charles Fletcher reports that the first therapeutic subject 
was “an unfortunate policeman aged 43”. From a simple “sore on his lips” (otherwise 
reported as a scratch from a rose bush or a shaving cut), the policeman had become 
seriously ill over the course of four months: 
“He had developed a combined staphylococcal and streptococcal septicemia. He 
had multiple abscesses on his face and his orbits (for which one eye had been 
removed): he also had osteomyelitis of his right humerus with discharging sinuses, 
and abscesses in his lungs. He was in great pain and was desperately and 
pathetically ill. There was all to gain for him in a trial of penicillin and nothing to 
lose.” (Fletcher, 1984)
  
On 12 February 1941, he was treated with 200 mg of penicillin, followed by 300 mg every 
three hours. To medical staff, the effect was astounding. An improvement was noticeable 
after just a day and after 5 days the patient was “vastly better”. The antibiotic era had 
begun. 
Antibiotics epitomize the impact of science and technology on health. Aspirin, perhaps the 
first modern pharmaceutical product, was manufactured and marketed in 1893, its 
forerunners a handful of 19
th century drugs, such as morphine, strychnine, quinine, 
caffeine, nicotine and codeine (David, 1997). The 20
th century saw technological innovation 
of an unprecedented pace and breadth. Sulphonamides were introduced in 1935, a large 
number of antibiotics in the years following the war, steroids from 1949, psychotropics from 
1952, and oral contraceptives from 1960. The revolution was about more than drugs. A 
whole array of machines was introduced. Some were life sustaining, such as the ventilator, 
the pacemaker or the kidney dialysis machine; some diagnostic, such as advanced imaging 
techniques, ultrasound and cardiac catheterization; and some surgical, such as the Zeiss 
operating microscope, Charnley’s hip replacement, and Hopkins endoscope. On the back 
of this technology, a number of previously inconceivable procedures were developed:   5 
coronary bypass, organ transplantation and the test tube baby, to name but a few of the 
more newsworthy (Le Fanu, 1999).  
Modern medicine was vastly different from anything that had come before (see Figure 1: 
Modern Medical Milestones). Ill health could now be systematically tackled, through a 
‘biomedical model’ based in science. A growing number of diseases could be reliably cured 
or, through vaccination, prevented or even eradicated. In rich countries, at least, the 20
th 
century hospital was able to make increasingly aggressive interventions, treating patients, 
rather than providing long-term care for the chronically sick. Patients had their blood and 
urine tested, were X-rayed and scanned, given drugs and operated on. Data were collected 
and systematic records kept. These changes occurred remarkably quickly. As Joel Howell 
argues in his analysis of the transformation of patient care in the first quarter of the last 
century: “by around 1925 the people who ran and financially supported the general hospital 
in the United States, as well as those who delivered health care within it, had come to see 
science as the essential tool for making the institution a central part of twentieth century 
medicine.” Medicine had become “quite actively and self-consciously based on science.”
 
(Howell, 1995)  
Three themes: discovery, development and distribution 
The scientific basis of modern medicine makes 20
th century health care an essentially 
cumulative endeavor, with each advance building on previous ones. Julius Comroe and 
Robert Dripps demonstrate this by asking why James Gibbon did not perform the first 
successful operation on an open heart with complete cardiopulmonary bypass until 1955 – 
108 years after the introduction of ether anesthesia. Their answer gives a clear impression 
of the many innovations that were needed:  
“First of all, the surgeon required precise postoperative diagnosis in every person 
whose heart needed repair. That required selective angiocardiography which, in 
turn, required the earlier discovery of cardiac catheterization, which required the still 
earlier discovery of X-rays. But the surgeon also needed an artificial heart-lung 
apparatus (pump oxygenator) to take over the function of the patient’s heart and 
lungs while he stopped the patient’s heart in order to open and repair it. For pumps, 
this required a design that would not damage the blood; for oxygenators, this 
required basic knowledge of the exchange of O2 and CO2 between gas and blood. 
However, even a perfect pump oxygenator would be useless if the blood in it 
clotted. Thus, the cardiac surgeon had to await the discovery and purification of a 
potent nontoxic anticoagulant – heparin.” (Comroe and Dripps
 , 1976)    6 
In all, they list 25 essential “bodies of knowledge” in which significant advances necessary 
to James Gibbon’s achievement (see Figure 2: 25 Essential Bodies of Knowledge). 
The importance of scientific progress to medicine is undeniable, but this should not be 
taken to mean that medical technology advances in an orderly and programmable fashion. 
First, it should be remembered that penicillin, like many 20
th century medical discoveries, 
owed as much to chance as it did design. Alexander Fleming had been studying means of 
inhibiting bacterial growth in 1928, but his breakthrough came unprompted, when a rare 
penicillium mould “wafted through the window” into a petri dish which had been left out of 
the incubator while he was on holiday. Nine unusually cool days followed, providing the 
perfect temperature for the mould to grow, and, on his return, Fleming happened to pick up 
the dish before it was washed and noticed how the staphylococci’s growth had been 
inhibited (Le Fanu, 1999). Most of the drug discoveries that have followed have also relied 
on chance – the difference being that researchers have played the chemical roulette 
systematically and repeatedly, with thousands of chemicals being tested on animals to see 
whether they are (a) effective; (b) safe to use and (c) capable of effective delivery. This 
“chemical roulette” is clearly scientific, but there are limits to what it can achieve. While the 
hard technology of medical machinery may be designed, pharmaceutical products generally 
have to be discovered. Furthermore, many drugs are used because they work, not because 
of a deep understanding of how and why they work. The result is an inevitably patchy 
armory, with antibiotics offering a “magic bullet” for use against bacteria, but nothing of 
similar potency emerging to combat the threat of viruses. The sequencing of the human 
genome opens up the possibility of a new era of drug development, based on a more 
rational and systematic approach. However, this promise is as yet unproven and meanwhile 
the old trial and error approach continues to be a staple of pharmaceutical development. 
Second, the discovery of penicillin would have been worthless without considerable further 
(if less lauded) development. Fleming published his results but was not successful in 
making anything of his discovery and, as a result, there is a curious thirteen-year hiatus in 
the penicillin story. As Sir Ian Fraser, a surgeon who led the original clinical trials, puts it: 
“Fleming had put penicillin on the map, but [Howard] Florey really put it on the market.” 
(Fraser, 1984) Together with a team that included Ernest Chain and Norma Heatley, Florey 
succeeded in extracting sufficient quantities of the drug for therapeutic use, but only with 
great difficulty. The mold could only be grown as a surface culture and, at some risk to his 
reputation, Florey turned his laboratory into a small (and somewhat unsafe) factory, 
collecting penicillin for use in “stacks of bedpans,” the only suitable receptacle he could find 
in sufficient quantities. Even so, early supplies of penicillin were so precious that the first 
patient’s urine was collected each night, so that the penicillin it contained could be 
extracted and given back to him. Despite this measure, supplies only lasted for five days   7 
and the unfortunate policeman “gradually deteriorated and died a month later.” (Fletcher, 
1984) There were further technical problems to overcome even to administer the drug to 
the first patients. As Fletcher explains, new equipment was needed to control the flow of 
drug into the patient’s body: “Marriott and Kekwick had just described a reliable flow control 
device…I quickly made up two or three of these gadgets and they functioned admirably.” 
(Fletcher 1984)
4 Basic scientific research may make the most visible – and best 
remembered – contribution to any new discovery, but it is only the start of a painstaking, 
time-consuming and expensive development process. Without this development, however 
brilliant the discovery, it is destined to languish on the laboratory shelf. 
Third, without the means of producing and distributing the new drug, there would be little 
wider benefit. Britain’s pharmaceutical industry had insufficient capacity to invest in 
developing techniques to extract sufficient quantities of the new drug for production. 
Florey’s team could only extract one part of penicillin per million of culture medium and 
even this was of insufficient purity (patients preferred receiving taking penicillin that had 
been extracted from their urine – it was purer and therefore caused less irritation when 
injected). The drug was also unstable and soon became ineffective when stored. In 1941, 
therefore, Florey and Heatley, funded by the Rockefeller Foundation, flew to the United 
States, where they tried, and initially failed, to interest American pharmaceutical companies 
in their project. Eventually, as the US focused its energies on the Second World War, the 
pair started to work with the U.S. Department of Agriculture’s Northern Regional Research 
Laboratory in Peoria, Illinois. A new species of Penicillium (apparently found on a moldy 
cantaloupe bought in a Peoria market) was used for production, after being mutated until it 
produced much higher quantities of the drug. In addition, a new method was developed for 
growing the mold, using 25,000-gallon tanks aerated in order that the mold would grow 
throughout the entire tank (Wong, 1998).  
As a result of these developments, Merck, Pfizer and Squibb agreed to collaborate on the 
production of the drug. By 1943, an extraordinary industrial effort had led to some 21 billion 
dosages being produced every month (Lesney et al, 2000). Undoubtedly, there was huge 
untapped demand for antibiotics, but it took war to crystallize this demand into a viable 
market; a command economy to set the wheels of industry rolling; and the orderly nature of 
modern armies to create an effective distribution channel. Even so, there were disparities in 
access, with British soldiers less likely to receive the drug than their American counterparts. 
Over 50 years later, these inequalities continue. Across the world, an unknown number of 
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however there was no incentive for any pharmaceutical company to fund further development until a false 
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people die each year as a result of bacterial infections amenable to quick, easy and cheap 
cure with antibiotics. In this – as with many other medical technologies – farm animals in 
developed countries are more likely to receive benefits than people in developing countries, 
with the World Health Organization estimating that 50% of all antibiotics are now used in 
agriculture (WHO 2000a).  
Understanding technology  
Donald Schon’s influential analysis of technological change, Technology and Change,
5 
usefully defines technology as “any tool or technique, any product or process, any physical 
equipment or method of doing or making, by which human capability is extended.” 
Meanwhile the term ‘social technology’ has been in use for several years, and several 
organisations
6 are involved in projects using that term. While little consensus exists, social 
technology here tends to be considered as that technology which is engaged in solving 
social problems.  This school also covers those considering how technologies are 
embedded and used in a social context. Thus, “instead of treating technology per se as the 
locus of historical agency, the soft determinists locate it in a far more various and complex 
social, economic, political and cultural matrix”.
7  
In this paper, we argue that there is a new space opening up between the schools of 
technological determinists, who have tended to emphasise tools and techniques rather than 
the hands and minds that use them, and social determinists, who have tended to do the 
reverse.  Both technology and society influence each other in complex ways, and are often 
functionally indivisible, like the chicken and the egg. For example, in the case of 
tuberculosis (TB) outlined in this paper, social and technological knowledge preceded the 
development of technologies with which to tackle TB, while those technologies in turn 
preceded their social utilization. Hospitals, meanwhile, are both a reflection of a kind of 
society and its attitude to health, but once created have also helped to change the direction 
of societies in which they exist. ‘Social technology’ is thus used here as a phrase 
demonstrating that neither social nor technological factors have primacy, for both are 
intertwined as intimately as the double helix of DNA.   
The story of penicillin demonstrates the complex relationship between medical science, 
technology and health. Technological innovation can have an enormous impact on health, 
but discoveries have never come easily and the “designer drug,” developed in a purposeful 
fashion from first principles, remains relatively rare. Successful research is only half the 
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7 Smith & Marx Editors, 1996, Does Technology Drive History, The MIT Press   9 
story – many potentially life-saving innovations are never exploited because critical 
development work is not undertaken. Finally, there is the problem of how to create a viable 
market that allows a technological innovation to have maximum effectiveness. Need must 
typically be expressed as demand, which raises fundamental challenges for societies and 
the way they are organized.  
Technology therefore cannot automatically remove obstacles that keep people from 
enjoying better health and, in some cases, it may help erect new barriers. As Eric Drexler 
puts it: “People who confuse science with technology tend to become confused about 
limits… they imagine that new knowledge always means new know-how; some even 
imagine that knowing everything would let us do anything.” (Drexler,1986)    10 
Two  “Standardized packages of treatment” 
The forgotten plague 
Tuberculosis (TB), once more commonly known as consumption because it is caused by a 
bacterium that literally consumes the body, is one of humanity’s oldest and most powerful 
scourges. Egyptian mummies from 2400 BCE show pathological signs of tubercular decay, 
while Hippocrates identified it as the most widespread disease of the time in 460 BCE 
(NJMS National Tuberculosis Center, 1996). According to the World Health Organization 
(WHO), TB currently kills around 2 million people each year. Unless it is more effectively 
controlled, nearly one billion people will be newly infected with the disease between 2000 
and 2020. In the same period, 200 million people will get sick and 35 million will die. Most of 
those will be in poor countries (WHO, 2000b). Currently, only two of 22 countries 
accounting for 80% of TB cases, Peru and Viet Nam, have reached WHO targets for case 
detection and treatment success. Meanwhile, in almost all countries, multi-drug resistant TB 
is a growing problem (WHO, 2000c). 
TB has been described as the “forgotten plague,” because many countries dismantled their 
TB control programs in the latter half of the twentieth century in the belief that the disease 
had been – or would soon be – defeated. In the 20
th Century, over a dozen anti-TB drugs 
were developed. Equally impressive diagnostic methods were also invented. However, as 
Paul Farmer argues, despite these technologies “tuberculosis has not really emerged so 
much as reemerged from the ranks of the poor… We indeed have the scientific knowledge 
– but the hard truth is that the “we” in question does not include the vast majority of the… 
people who [die] from tuberculosis.” Unequal access prevented a decisive strike against the 
disease. Now that window of opportunity seems to have closed, a synergistic relationship 
between HIV and TB, alongside growing drug resistance, is causing a resurgence of the 
disease. According to Farmer, both rich and poor now face “truly novel problems,” with the 
probability of pan-resistant strains to come (Farmer, 1999). 
At the turn of the last century, TB was an uncontrolled problem for the world’s industrial 
countries with around 1 in 10 Americans dying of the disease. However, between 1900 and 
1920, that fell by a factor of ten, and by a further factor of ten between 1920 and 1950 
(Ruggiero, 2000). 1950 was also the year in which results were published showing that the 
first effective cure for the disease (a combination therapy of PAS, a relative of aspirin, and 
the antibiotic streptomycin) had been discovered. Before that, the only technological 
intervention was to collapse the lung (artificial pneumothorax) or undertake some 
equivalent surgical technique. This drastic, but partially effective, intervention, based on the 
theory that the lung would heal if it was able to rest, could only be used in relatively few 
cases.  The war against TB, therefore, began with a highly successful pre-technological   11 
battle, where the weapons deployed were social ones. Public health, not biomedical 
science, was the dominant model. New institutional constraints, new forms of organization 
and a mass mobilization of the public all played a significant role. Given knowledge about 
the threat TB presented, the US proved capable of protecting itself even with inadequate 
technology at its disposal. The availability of effective technology allowed a second assault 
against TB to be mounted, but this demonstrated that technology is not enough on its own. 
As resistance increased, a third battle has been necessary, focusing on the social context 
of the technology, by paying renewed attention to the way that patients use TB drugs. 
The first battle 
Without an understanding of what TB was, and how it spread, societies had little ability to 
combat it. This knowledge emerged slowly. The earliest reference to the infectious nature 
of TB was made in a 1699 edict from the Republic of Lucca, Italy, which stated that, 
“henceforth, human health should no longer be endangered by objects remaining after the 
death of a consumptive. The names of the deceased should be reported to the authorities, 
and measures undertaken for disinfection.” In 1720, Benjamin Marten, an English 
physician, speculated that the disease was possibly caused by “wonderfully minute living 
creatures”, observing that by “conversing so nearly as to draw in part of the breath he emits 
from the Lungs, a consumption may be caught by a sound person.” In 1865, the French 
doctor Jean-Antoine Villemin demonstrated that consumption could be passed from 
humans to cattle and from cattle to rabbits and postulated that the disease was caused by a 
microorganism. Finally, in 1882, Robert Koch invented a staining technique that enabled 
him to see the TB bacillus and provide a convincing description of how TB is spread 
(Ruggiero, 2000).   
This knowledge was enough to launch the first battle against TB in the US. In 1893, just 
eleven years after Koch’s discovery, a pioneering report by Dr Hermann Michael Biggs to 
the New York City Board of Health brought the new knowledge about the infectious nature 
of TB to the attention of US policymakers. This report explored the implications for public 
health of the theory that TB was communicable – and therefore preventable. Dr Hermann 
Biggs, widely regarded as a public health visionary, was quite explicit about at least one 
aspect of the relationship between health and economics: “Public health is purchasable.”  
He continued, “Any community can determine its own death rate.” (Garey & Hott, 1995)  
The Biggs report led to a concerted effort to change US society and provide US citizens 
with the “public good” of a TB-free environment. New health organizations were created to 
service novel testing and reporting regimes, while the consumptive hospital movement 
used isolation to inhibit transmission.    12 
A number of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) were also born, indicating the 
breadth of involvement or “participation” in the early parts of the war against TB. Chief 
among these was the National Association for the Study and Prevention of Tuberculosis, 
which was founded in 1904 and later renamed the National Tuberculosis Association and 
finally the American Lung Association. Together with other organizations, it mobilized the 
public through mass fund-raising campaigns, reporting at the time that “no nationwide 
program has rested for so many years on so broad a base made up of millions of small 
gifts.”
8 Public and civil sectors also helped to drive behavioral change at an individual level. 
Hospitals carried signs saying “spit is poison”, while notices in public places warned that 
spitting on the floor spread disease (Ruggiero, 2000).  (See Figure 4: A Century of 
Advances in Tuberculosis Control, United States). Popular culture also played a part with, 
for example, blues artist Victoria Spivey recording no less than three songs on the subject, 
“TB Blues”, “Dirty TB Blues” and “TB’s Got Me”.
9 
The second battle 
The second battle against TB used a technological solution to intensify the campaign, as 
the biomedical model took over from these pioneering public health interventions. In the 
first battle, knowledge about how to prevent the spread of TB was interpreted time and 
again, through a range of social structures. This effort required a vast amount of 
determination, cohesion and unity of purpose, especially important against a disease that 
was so easy to catch (a single cough can contain 3000 infective droplets, with fewer than 
10 mycobacterial bacilli sufficient to initiate a pulmonary infection) (Li and Brainard, 2000). 
Technology, on the other hand, encapsulates this knowledge, providing a relatively reliable 
interpretation intervention that can be reproduced countless times. A drug or a machine has 
demonstrated efficacy. In theory, consistent manufacture ensures consistent performance, 
producing what Peter David calls “standardized packages of treatment” that can be used in 
similar ways across the world (David, 1997). 
The second battle against TB drove the disease down to vanishingly small levels in the US, 
showing the efficacy of technology in creating positive health outcomes. However, this 
battle also demonstrates some of the other factors needed in play for such results to be 
achieved. A drug is not created to consistently high levels of quantity and quality without 
great effort, a battle still not won in many countries, where medical technologies are 
                                                  
8 The March of Dimes provides another well-known, if later, example. Established in 1938 by President 
Roosevelt to eradicate polio, the March of Dimes led to the development of the polio vaccine within twenty 
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9 The enduring legacy of disease in popular culture is a subject of considerable interest in its own right, given 
culture’s capacity to act as an effective communication medium. See, for example, Paul Oliver and Richard 
A. Wright, 1994. Blues Fell This Morning: Meaning in the Blues. Second Edition, Cambridge University 
Press.    13 
frequently manufactured to inadequate standards, either by accident or through deliberate 
fraud (Silverman, Lydecker and Lee, 1992). In the West, according to Theodore Porter, the 
pharmaceutical industry went through a preparatory period in the early twentieth century 
when the principal use of science was not to create new products, but to find ways of 
standardizing and testing existing ones. This was a tricky, time-consuming and sometimes 
even comic process. As one frustrated observer commented on the plethora of biological 
tests (where a drug’s purity or toxicity was tested against its ability to induce a reaction in a 
laboratory animal): “we have cat units, rabbit units, rat units, mouse units, dog units, and, 
latest addition of all, pigeon units. The field of tame laboratory animals having been nearly 
exhausted, it remains for the bolder spirits to discover methods in which a lion or elephant 
unit may be described.” (Porter, 1995)  
As well as new forms of quality control for manufacture, it was also necessary to invent new 
methods of measuring efficacy. The testing of the cure for TB brought the clinical trial into 
the mainstream. Austin Bradford Hill, Professor of Medical Statistics at the London School 
of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine (who himself had survived TB through bed rest and an 
artificial collapse of the lung), first performed a trial of streptomycin on its own, arguing that 
a trial should be conducted because there were insufficient quantities of the drug in Britain 
for it to be made available for widespread treatment. “I could argue in this situation,” he 
commented, “it would not be immoral to do a trial – it would be immoral not to, since the 
opportunity would never come again as there would be plenty of streptomycin.”
10 This trial 
offered a dramatic vindication of statistical methods. Initially, streptomycin seemed to offer 
dramatic benefits, but these soon diminished as resistance to the drug increased. It was not 
until PAS and streptomycin were tested together from 1948-1950 that survival rates 
increased to over 80%. The double blind clinical trial – where patients are randomly 
allocated to receive and not receive a new therapy, without either patient or physician 
aware who has been allocated to which group – had proved its worth and would soon be in 
common use across medicine (Le Fanu, 1999).  
Over time, the social control of medical technology has been enshrined in legislation, 
providing a semi-permanent guarantor of a technology’s provenance, efficacy and 
production standards. In the US, the Biological Controls Act in 1902, and the Pure Food 
and Drugs Act in 1906, were pioneers.  International procedures were first formalized when 
L’Office International d’Hygiène Publique was established in Paris in 1907. By the 1940s, 
the Federal Trade Commission in the US was forcing drug manufacturers to both prove any 
                                                  
10 It is interesting to remember that arguments about the ethics of trials date back to Bradford Hill’s work. If a 
potentially life-saving drug is available, it is questionable whether the intervention should be denied to 
patients who may die before a trial has been completed. In recent years, as a result of pressure from AIDS 
advocacy groups, the FDA has showed an increasing willingness to fast track drugs through the approval 
process.   14 
claims made for their products and show that they were safe. By 1962, following the 
thalidomide disaster, standards for clinical research were tightened considerably. In 1964, 
the Declaration of Helsinki set international standards for research and informed consent. 
The pharmaceutical industry is now so highly regulated that the ethics of lengthy testing of 
potentially life-saving medicines is now in question. However, the need for the strong 
governance of medical technologies is universally accepted. While the development of 
some technologies has been increasingly deregulated, social control of medical technology 
necessarily remains strong.  
The third battle 
The need for the US to gather forces for a third battle against TB shows that, while in a 
well-functioning society the development and production of technology can be effectively 
controlled, the use of that technology is much less susceptible to legislation. Whether used 
by professionals or lay people, inconsistencies in the use of technologies are almost 
inevitable and the opportunity for misuse ever present. This may be the result of poor 
instruction, for example the inadequate or deliberately misleading labeling of a 
pharmaceutical (common in many developing world countries) (Silverman et al, 1992), or it 
may result from predictable variations in human behavior. Even if treatment was without 
cost of any kind – in terms of side effects and time, as well as financially (which, of course, 
it never is) – some patients will, inevitably, cease treatment before a cure is completed.  
Even in clinical trials, where patients are presumably more carefully monitored and 
controlled, a large number of patients do not use test medicines as instructed. In one recent 
study, patients with respiratory problems were given metered-dose inhalers with detectors 
to find out how many were taking the dose correctly. 30% of those not told about the 
detector did not follow instructions (New Scientist, 26 August 2000).  
With TB, the infection remains long after the symptoms have disappeared and the 
treatment is long and unpleasant. The result of a failure to complete courses of treatment 
has been the inevitable rise of drug resistant strains across the world (WHO 2000d).
11 In 
the US, the issue achieved prominence in 1991, when it was revealed that 19% of all TB 
cases in New York City were resistant to the two most effective TB drugs (Isoniazid and 
                                                  
11 According to the World Health Organisation: “Treatment failures occur when patients are either dosed with 
poor quality drugs, have limited access to, or are non-compliant with existing therapies. Insufficient treatment 
results in a roller-coaster ride of brief reprieves followed by relapses that grow ever more impregnable to 
available medications each time the TB organism rallies Currently, a single treatment course of six months 
for regular tuberculosis costs as little as US$ 20. With MDR-TB, the costs shoot upward to US$ 2 000, or 
even more… The ability of HIV to accelerate the onset of acute MDR-TB has serious implications for 
humanity. In crowded hospitals filled with immuno-suppressed individuals, resistant TB has the potential to 
stalk relentlessly through a population, afflicting patients, health care workers and physicians alike. War, 
poverty, overcrowding, mass migration and the breakdown of existing medical infrastructures all contribute to 
MDR-TB's development, transmission and spread.” See: Overcoming Antimicrobial Resistance – World 
Health Report in Infectious Diseases 2000, World Health Organisation, 2000   15 
Rifampin). Half of these patients had already been treated at least once and some for many 
months. In Central Harlem, at the time, only 11% of patients finished their treatment 
(Fujiwara & Frieden, 2000). Americans found themselves oddly ill-equipped to re-engage in 
the battle against TB. Few doctors had experience dealing with the disease and public 
health structures had suffered years of neglect and under-investment (Garrett, 2000).  
At the heart of the third battle lie attempts to redesign anti-TB technology from the user’s 
point of view. This redesign could have been encapsulated within the technology itself – for 
example, a delivery mechanism that would steadily release its payload over a sufficient 
period of time (as in a contraceptive implant). However, in the case of TB, redesigning the 
social context of delivery proved more practicable and resulted in directly observed 
treatment (DOTs), where the patient is observed taking each treatment. With DOTs, the 
patient is, according to a former director of the New York City TB control problem, “the VIP.” 
(Fujiwara & Frieden 2000). The “comprehensive, convenient, and user-friendly” approach is 
intended to increase compliance levels (Farmer, 1999). As the Mississippi TB controller 
describes it: “The public health nurse persists through heat or snow, wind or rain, dogs, 
gangs, or alligators and finds the patients and persistently guides, cajoles, or bribes them 
through treatment. If, along the way, that means baking a few extra cookies, making an 
extra trip after work to deliver a home-cooked meal to a homeless or lonely patient… that’s 
nothing special. That’s just the way DOT happens.” (Holcombe
 , 2000) DOTs is now 
recommended by the WHO for all countries, with 43% of the global population having 
access to DOTs in 1998, double the figure in 1995 (WHO 2000c).  
Knowledge, health and wealth 
The three battles against TB show some of the strengths and weaknesses of technology. 
The first battle demonstrates that technology is only one vehicle for knowledge about 
health, but as the second battle shows, it is a vehicle with important advantages, providing 
results that are less reliant on the vagaries of human behavior. However, as the third battle 
demonstrates, “less reliant” does not mean “not reliant”.  How a technology is used, or its 
“market-orientation”, is ultimately critical to its efficacy. Used in the wrong way a problem 
can be exacerbated, as drug resistance, for example, rises. However, the failure to use a 
technology widely enough can also be disastrous. It is the survival of vast pockets of TB 
among the world’s poor that has led to the prospect that the disease may once again 
trouble those who are relatively wealthier. 
The war against TB also indicates that communities can be good or bad at using the 
knowledge that leads to health. The public health effort of the first half of the century was 
an extraordinary one, requiring massive social mobilization and change. The reverses at 
the end of that century show how easy it is to squander a technology’s potential.   16 
Knowledge is not destiny, technology even less so. Herman Bigg’s assertion still holds true 
today – a society must choose how healthy it will be.     17 
Three  The problems we face 
A challenge refused 
According to the world’s largest scientific society, the American Chemical Society: “the 
influenza pandemic of 1918-1920 demonstrated the inability of medical science to stand up 
against disease. More than 20 million people worldwide were killed by a flu that attacked 
not just the old and frail but also the young and strong. This was a disease that no magic 
bullet could cure and no government could stamp out… Monopoly capitalism and renewed 
conservatism battled against government intervention in health care… The continued 
explosive growth of cities obviated many of the earlier benefits in sanitation and hygiene 
with a host of new “imported” diseases.” (Lesney et al, 2000) 
As with flu in 1918, so with HIV/AIDS today (Bloom 2000). The disease first surfaced in 
1981, when the New York Times reported an outbreak of a rare cancer among gay men in 
California and New York, although the oldest HIV sequence yet discovered dates from the 
1950s and the current best guess is that the virus crossed from chimpanzees to humans in 
1930 (Korber et al, 2000). Since the 1980s the HIV/AIDS epidemic has grown with 
phenomenal speed. According to the latest figures, 5.3 million people were infected with 
HIV in 2000 and 36.1 million people are now living with HIV/AIDS. There were an estimated 
3 million AIDS deaths in 2000 and the epidemic has probably now killed more than the 
1918 flu epidemic, claiming some 21.8 million victims. Simple mathematics indicates that 
this figure will rise above 50 million, in the absence of a cure, the infected die. The epidemic 
seems to be peaking in Sub-Saharan Africa, where such a large proportion of adults are 
now infected (8.8%) that it is hard for the situation to grow much worse. The situation is still 
deteriorating in Eastern Europe, the current rise in Russia is described as exponential, and 
the situation in China is worsening. Only in rich countries is the epidemic under any form of 
control and even then, mini-epidemics thrive in deprived communities (UNAIDS 2000). 
HIV/AIDS raises fundamental questions about the world we live in. HIV spreads along 
economic pathways, with openness to trade leading to vulnerability to disease (Bloom & 
River Path Associates, 2000). It therefore represents the dark side of economic 
globalization, raising fundamental questions about the benefits of an inter-dependent world 
system (Garrett 2000).
12 While the world is able to mobilize to protect oil supplies in the 
Gulf, it currently lacks the institutional capability to tackle existing and new health threats. 
                                                  
12 It is interesting to compare the reaction to a reported outbreak of plague in Surat, India. According to 
Laurie Garrett: “In less than a week 500,000 residents of Surat had fled, forming a diaspora of Suratis that, 
thanks to India’s vast train system, now stretched from the Himalayas to Sri Lanka. An estimated 600,000 
day workers and business travellers who normally visited the gem and fabric districts of Surat stayed away. 
Thus, less than half of Surat’s typical daily census of 2.2 million remained. They were the poorest of the 
Gujarat State’s poor.” See Garrett 2000 op cit.   18 
The UN system did not manage the early epidemic very effectively, while UNAIDS – a new 
organization that took over responsibility for the epidemic in 1996 – has a patchy if 
improving record. Even if these organizations had responded impeccably, however, their 
efforts would still have been inadequate. The resources and the political will are simply not 
available for an international response to match, in the early 21
st century, the scale and 
intensity of America’s mobilization against TB one hundred years ago. 
Knowledge is not enough 
The example of TB demonstrated the power of knowledge about health, not just as a 
precursor to technological development, but as an effective tool in the battle against a 
disease or other health problem. The World Bank has tried to quantify the importance of the 
impact of knowledge, estimating that the generation and utilization of knowledge accounts 
for 45% of the fall in the under-5 mortality rate in 115 low and middle-income countries. 
Another 38% of the fall is attributed to improved education among women, who are thus 
enabled to act as more effective receptors and conduits for knowledge about health. 
Meanwhile, only 17% of the decline is attributed to income (See Figure 2: Contributors to 
Falling Mortality Rates). Such estimates are just that – estimates – but nevertheless provide 
a clear pointer to the importance of key factors. WHO research, analyzing data from 1952-
1992, provides a similar finding. In the period studied, average per capita income increased 
from $1530 to $2560 (in 1985 international dollars).  If the income-mortality relationship had 
remained as it was in 1952, infant mortality would have dropped from 144 per thousand to 
116 per thousand by 1992.  In reality, however, it fell much more sharply to 55 per 
thousand, with factors other than rising wealth affecting the outcome (WHO 1999).  
However, the spread of HIV demonstrates clearly that the existence of knowledge about a 
disease is not enough. Such knowledge was generated relatively quickly. Early suspicions 
that AIDS was caused by drug abuse quickly proved unfounded and, by 1983, a retrovirus 
had been identified as the possible cause of the syndrome (Bloom, Bloom and River Path 
Associates 2000). HIV infection is relatively hard to acquire, so within only two years of the 
disease hitting the front pages, communities were handed the knowledge necessary for 
self-protection. 
Armed with this information, some communities proved remarkably successful at protecting 
themselves. In the United States and other rich countries, for example, the gay community 
was hit first and hardest by the epidemic. However, despite the fact that their sexual 
behavior was significantly more risky than that found among most other populations, gay 
communities responded rapidly and effectively (Bloom & Glied). As with the war against TB, 
new organizations sprung up and behavioral change was facilitated. Indeed, in some ways 
the disease seemed to galvanize and strengthen these communities. It is not only rich   19 
communities that have taken effective action. Senegal, Uganda and Thailand provide 
examples of poorer countries acting decisively. In Senegal, for example, condom use has 
increased rapidly, with approximately two thirds of men and half of women using them 
during from casual sex, up from around 1 percent at the start of the epidemic. 
The contrast with countries where the disease has run uncontrolled is painful. In such 
countries, awareness of HIV/AIDS is generally now high, but this awareness has not 
translated into social mobilization or behavioral change. According to Jack Caldwell: “there 
is less public or media discussion of AIDS in Zimbabwe, with an adult seroprevalence level 
approaching 30 percent, than there is in Thailand, with a level of 2 percent.” (Caldwell
  
2000) Such countries now seem locked into a vicious spiral. Their inability to absorb and 
utilize knowledge about preventing the spread of HIV can be seen as a reflection of the 
inadequacies of their social organization. In turn, the epidemic is corroding social and 
economic structures. AIDS kills wage earners and leaves orphans to fend for themselves. It 
weakens government, the education system and health services. All three forms of capital – 
physical, social and human – disappear at once. 
The example of HIV shows how societies vary in their ability to acquire and utilize 
knowledge. As Jared Diamond has argued, this variation is political, not innate, and liable to 
short term change as conservative and progressive factions compete for leadership 
(Diamond 1997). Knowledge about health will only make a difference within a sympathetic 
political or policy environment. Significant and sustained health improvements across a 
society cannot be expected to follow automatically from knowledge. It is only in those 
societies where broad investment in health is a priority where health has consistently 
improved. 
The failure of science 
As with TB, knowledge about HIV/AIDS has been more immediately applicable through 
public health measures than it has been through medical intervention. And, as with the 
1918 flu epidemic, we still face “the inability of medical science to stand up against 
disease.” Although frequently promised, a technological solution has not arrived and still 
seems far off. 
Most medical advances have occurred in helping treat (though not cure) those who have 
already fallen sick with AIDS. The US Food and Drug Administration (FDA) now lists over 
40 approved therapies that slow or disrupt viral replication or treat opportunistic infections   20 
(FDA).
13 These treatments represent a remarkably poor fit with what those suffering from 
AIDS really need. A treatment regime with highly active anti-retroviral therapy (HAART) 
costs up to $20,000 per year and is currently available to only 1% of those living with HIV 
(Bloom and River Path Associates, 2000).
14 The most effective drugs are unavailable 
where they are needed most, a situation that has mired rich and poor governments, 
multilateral agencies and pharmaceutical companies, nongovernmental organizations and 
AIDS activists in increasingly bitter controversy. Even for those who can get treatment, the 
available drugs are far from ideal. They do not provide a cure and the side effects can be 
dramatically unpleasant (everything from a disfiguring redistribution of body fat to liver 
disease). Doctors are not even certain how these “standardized packages” should best be 
used. US doctors have ridiculed UK doctors for conservative treatment protocols, but the 
US Department of Health and Human Services has just announced more cautious 
prescribing guidelines, in what the New Scientist describes as a “humiliating U-turn” from its 
early “hit hard, hit early” treatment advice. In the absence of a stunning breakthrough, AIDS 
treatment seems likely to remain as much therapeutic art as medical science. 
Technology’s record in aiding prevention is even less impressive, with the humble condom 
still the most effective preventive tool by many orders of magnitude. The International AIDS 
Vaccine Initiative (IAVI) is scathing about the lack of investment in vaccine development, 
with only US$300-350 million spent annually - just 2% of the total money spent on the AIDS 
epidemic. “Much of this is from national research agencies for basic research,” it 
comments. “It is industry that makes products and industry has not had the incentives to 
invest heavily in product development and has had virtually negative incentives to invest in 
creating products for developing countries. As a result, the vaccine pipeline is narrow and 
few products are moving forward.” (IAVI
 , 2000)  
The World Bank concurs, identifying two problems. First, our understanding of how to 
induce HIV immunity is inadequate. Many different approaches will therefore have to be 
tested in parallel, with little certainty about their effectiveness, a “try-and-see” approach that 
shows how medical science is still some way from being able to reliably build vaccines from 
the ground up. Second, the need for a vaccine has not been expressed as a demand 
strong enough to galvanize either the public or private sector (World Bank 2000).  Not 
much, it seems, has changed from the days of the development of penicillin. Although the 
septic wards were full and the suffering of the patients they contained immense, this in itself 
was not a sufficient incentive for the development of antibiotics. A catalyst – in the case of 
                                                  
13 For a complete list, see FDA, “Approved Drugs for HIV/AIDS or AIDS-Related Conditions,” last updated 6 
July 1999 (available at http://www.fda.gov/oashi/aids/stat_app.html); “Antiretroviral Drugs Approved by FDA 
for HIV,” last updated 2 March 2000 (available at http://www.fda.gov/oashi/aids/virals.html). 
14 For a fuller discussion of access to AIDS treatment see David E. Bloom and River Path Associates (2000), 
Something To Be Done: Treating HIV/AIDS, Science, Vol. 288, 23 June 2000.   21 
penicillin, war – was needed to crystallize demand and encourage a range of actors to pull 
in the same direction. Just expecting change to happen was not enough. 
Public goods and private benefits 
For medical science to have a greater impact on AIDS – and on many other uncontrolled 
health problems – substantial changes are needed in the way science is practiced. Most 
urgently, incentives must be created to ensure investment is directed at those problems 
which have the most dramatic impact on global health. Health is a “public good” i.e. the 
sum of benefits provided by good health to a community is greater than the sum of private 
benefits accruing to each community member. Market failures are therefore inevitable 
without corrective action. 
Two kinds of incentive are possible: mechanisms which aim either to ‘push’ or ‘pull’ desired 
outcomes. Push mechanisms, such as public investment in research, are relatively 
common. However, it is uncertain whether, in the past, the public has received adequate 
return for its investment in technologies that have ended up in private hands (AZT provides 
one controversial example). Experimental new approaches must therefore be developed.  
IAVI’s investment in AIDS vaccine development provides one example. The initiative was 
founded in 1996 with $120 million from public and private sources to be spent on research 
aimed at finding a vaccine for AIDS.  IAVI’s founder Seth Berkley describes it as a model of 
“social venture capital”, with investments made in private sector research on the basis of 
differential pricing for developing countries. In other words, questions surrounding the 
distribution of new products have been at least partially settled before the research has 
commenced.  
In contrast, ‘pull’ mechanisms, where payment is made for research outputs, aim to mimic 
the market and harness the private sector’s well-deserved reputation for innovation. An 
early example of a ‘pull’ incentive was the prize of £20,000 offered in 1714 by the British 
Parliament for anyone who could come up with a sufficiently accurate method to measure 
longitude, needed because of the significant loss of life and merchandise cause by the 
inability of ships to accurately gauge their position. Parliament was responding to a petition 
signed by “Captains of Her Majesty’s Ships, Merchants of London, and Commanders of 
Merchant-Men,” which demanded that “the government pay attention to the longitude 
problem – and hasten the day when longitude shall cease to be a problem – by offering rich 
rewards to anyone who could find longitude at sea accurately and practicably.” (Sobel, 
1996) In its latest development report, the World Bank uses similar reasoning: “[to] ensure 
a large market for vaccines in poor countries, [the international community] could create a 
fund or other credible precommitment mechanism for purchasing, for the poorest countries, 
many doses of vaccines shown to be cost effective and affordable.” (WDR 2000)    22 
Incentive mechanisms have the added advantage of being highly visible. Push 
mechanisms, such as the Manhattan Project, have secured wide public support. Pull 
mechanisms can also capture the public imagination, as the competitive element creates 
and sustains the kind of strong narrative that is attractive to the media. Pull mechanisms 
have the added advantage of being fresh and under-utilized. Political leaders have 
repeatedly promised to galvanize researchers to defeat a particular disease and have, 
oftentimes, failed to deliver on this promise. Harnessing the competitive instincts of the 
private sector has been tried much less often. 
As the example of TB shows, widespread involvement in the war against ill health is of 
incalculable value. A high profile incentive to tackle a key global health problem could focus 
international public attention on health, motivate further investment and stimulate 
desperately needed institutional innovation. As Ravi Kanbur and Todd Sandler have 
argued: “at a time when development assistance is on the decline owing to a 
disillusionment with past results and domestic demands for the associated resources, a 
public goods rationale can ignite a renewed interest in some kinds of development 
assistance activities. (Kanbur, Sandler, Morrison, 1999)  The challenge is to find at an 
international level what malariologist Leonard Bruce-Chwatt calls “a great deal of steady 
devotion to a very distant goal.” 
A new model 
AIDS will not be the last new health challenge we face. Indeed, as antibiotics decline in 
efficacy, it is possible that the world faces a return to an era where a growing, rather than 
shrinking, number of infectious diseases become uncontrollable. In addition, the world is 
aging and faces a growing non-infectious health burden, with health systems struggling to 
cope with an increasing number of conditions that have traditionally been expensive to 
treat. 
The lessons of AIDS point to the need to take an increasingly strategic view of the 
development of health systems, and of the technology that will enable them both to be 
technically effective and cost effective. Scientists are justly proud of their ability to innovate 
rapidly, but the effort to develop technologies to combat AIDS has clearly been hampered 
by an inability to confront new challenges. Increasingly, however, scientific research will be 
directed towards clear goals, with funders insisting that problems are tackled according to 
the types of “real world” solutions required (Gibbons, Limoges, Nowotny, Schwartzman, 
Scott and Trow, 1994). Inevitably, much of this strategic direction will be imposed by private 
companies, as a direct result of the scale of their investment in research and development. 
This risks further exacerbating the tendency for the problems that have the most serious 
effect on the largest number of people to receive an inadequate share of funding and   23 
development effort. Governments, international institutions and NGOs are therefore likely to 
feel increasing pressure: first to protect and advance the public good offered by widespread 
access to the technologies that promote health; and, second, to strengthen relationships 
with the private sector in order to influence and direct the private sector agenda. Progress 
towards improving the health of all people is possible, but it is a reasonable assumption that 
neither public nor private sector can achieve this on its own.    24 
Four Social  Technology 
Crucial questions 
As medical research becomes increasingly goal oriented, the key question is who will set 
the goals and whether those goals will lead to new technologies that make healthcare more 
efficient, equitable and cost effective. 
The eventual answer to this question will rely both on what new technologies are 
discovered and on how new and existing technologies are used. For the former, the 
development of the relationship between the public and private sectors will be crucial, as 
will the ability of new types of research to deliver on their undoubted promise. The latter 
relies on measures to improve the availability and suitability of technologies, but also on the 
ability of societies, communities and individuals to organize to make the most of the 
benefits new technology offers. In both cases, in other words, a consideration of the 
relationship between technology and health requires an exploration of both “narrow” and 
“broad” issues. The narrow issues involve the nature of technology itself and its 
development - the broad ones how human beings generate and utilize knowledge. 
Health advocates must therefore emphasize the importance of investment in knowledge 
and in technologies likely to improve health. It is hard to see how today’s health problems 
will be solved without further technological development – and, as AIDS has shown, new 
health problems are likely to continue to make improving health a moving target. But 
advocates must also argue for the institutional innovations that allow a society to use 
knowledge and new technologies to achieve lasting benefits. Without modernization and, in 
some cases, root and branch reform – at national and international levels, and in the 
developed and developing world – progress is unlikely. Equally, the role of the individual 
within health systems is essential. Technological solutions can increase the tendency to 
see the patient as a passive receiver of care, but as the example of AIDS and TB has 
shown, health is much more likely to be achieved when it is actively pursued both from the 
top-down and the bottom-up. 
We therefore look at how public and private sectors work together to produce knowledge, 
and also at the nature and promise of new types of biomedical research. We also examine 
information technology, a technology that has the potential to have as great a potential on 
the way that medical technologies are used, as it is already having on the way that new 
technologies are produced. Finally we introduce the concept of social technology, which 
attempts to tie together the concept of technology and its use. On its own, a technological 
approach is insufficient, but this does not mean that one that excludes medical science and   25 
concentrates on social change will be more useful. The two must be considered together if 
it is to fulfill its potential for progress in the area of human health. 
Public and private 
It is at the boundary of the public and private sectors that many of the decisive battles over 
health will be fought. Private sector influence over the provision of health is growing even in 
countries such as the United Kingdom with a strong history of public health provision. 
Meanwhile, in many countries, including most of the poorest, much health care is already 
privately delivered and funded. However, as the lessons of penicillin, TB, and HIV/AIDS 
show, health is not something that the market provides efficiently or equitably on its own. In 
a purely private system, market failures are inevitable and individual health-seeking 
behavior within a market system will often be antithetical to a community’s longer-term 
interest in good health. 
Co-operation between public and private sectors is therefore essential at the national and 
international levels. However, achieving true public/private partnership is no trivial matter, 
as shown by one attempt at building co-operation at a global level. The Children’s Vaccine 
Initiative (CVI), launched in 1990, was conceived as a response to the fact that investment 
levels in the development of some of the most cost-effective technologies – vaccines – had 
fallen to absurdly low levels. In addition, as shown in by Appendix 1, existing vaccines were 
(and, in many cases, continue to be) poorly distributed. The CVI was conceived as an “end 
to end mission” to get vaccines from the laboratory bench to the field. It was intended to 
focus on the technology (how to develop new vaccines), as well as the social context (what 
kind of vaccines could be most effectively distributed).  
William Muraskin’s account of the rise and fall of the CVI demonstrates the huge distance 
that still exists between the public and private sector, even when a cause as powerful as 
children’s health is at stake. In many ways, the lessons of penicillin had still not been 
learned, and the CVI faced a tough task in persuading public sector scientists, who excel in 
basic research, of the importance of the development work carried out in the private sector. 
Public sector scientists had low levels of awareness of the “long, laborious, unglamorous, 
and unheralded” work of “creating high quality batches of a candidate vaccine for testing, 
carrying out clinical trials to demonstrate safety and efficacy, finding appropriate doses, 
meeting complex licensing requirements, solving the problems of scale-up to high volume 
manufacturing, and arranging for packaging, shipping and marketing.” Muraskin reports a 
“great gulf of distrust, often bordering on outright contempt” between people in the public 
and private sectors. Those in the public sector often saw themselves as on a crusade to 
save lives and regarded profit as immoral. For those in the private sector, meanwhile, “profit 
was the engine of innovation.” They regarded public sector organizations as untrustworthy   26 
partners, who were wasteful of resources, all too prepared to indulge in endless turf wars, 
and capricious in their decision-making (Muraskin, 2000).  
Unfortunately, the brief history of the CVI involved each sector essentially acting up to its 
stereotype. American pharmaceutical companies, for example, refused even to stay in the 
room when the issue of differential pricing of vaccines for developing countries was 
discussed, while WHO was never happy with the existence of the CVI – an organization it 
ran, but which it believed had been poorly conceived from the start. The initiative was finally 
closed down by WHO in 1999, after a decade of bureaucratic maneuvering, negotiations 
conducted in bad faith, and declining effectiveness. The breakdown left supporters of the 
initiative demoralized. Industry was especially upset, convinced the public sector had once 
again shown its basic untrustworthiness. “There were many who felt that the atmosphere 
was so charged with animosity and recrimination,” writes Muraskin, “that there was a 
danger that it could never be repaired.”  
There had been some successes. Multilateral organizations, such as UNICEF and WHO, 
began to take the role of research more seriously. The importance of incremental 
innovations – such as one that makes a vaccine easier to administer – became clear. And 
important steps were made in tackling the problems of manufacturing high quality vaccines 
in developing countries. In addition, the CVI now has two successors. The International 
Vaccine Institute (IVI) in Korea is planning to move into a $50 million laboratory on the 
campus of Seoul National University in late 2001, where research projects will be continued 
on Japanese encephalitis, rotavirus and pneumococcal infections, as well as an oral 
cholera vaccine that will cost only 20 cents a dose (Science Magazine, 1999). And the 
Global Alliance on Vaccines and Immunization (GAVI) has been created with essentially 
the same remit as the CVI, but with the marked advantage of the philanthropy of the Bill 
and Melinda Gates Foundation which has, to date, donated $100 million to the initiative. 
The IVI, GAVI and IAVI are all just beginning their work. They all have ambitious objectives 
and all expect to involve both public and private actors, as well as funders. Only time will 
tell whether they too will leave a record of disappointed expectations. If they do, the 
judgment of international public opinion is likely to be harsh. The public sector will have 
shown that despite repeated promises of reform, it is incapable of effective delivery. Big 
business, meanwhile, will have shown that it will never shoulder the responsibilities its size 
demands. As the ongoing controversy over access to AIDS drugs has shown, global health 
can quickly become a powerful political issue, especially when it is placed within the context 
of wider protests about the perceived iniquities of globalization. The cost of a failure of 
public and private sectors to co-operate successfully is therefore likely to be great.   27 
Big tech/small tech 
The American Chemical Society’s review of “the pharmaceutical century” argues that “the 
rise of molecular biology, with its promise of genetic engineering, fostered a new way of 
looking at drug design. Instead of an empirical “ trial and error” method, pharmaceutical 
designers [in the 1980s] began to compare knowledge of human physiology and the causes 
of medical disorders with knowledge of drugs and their methods of physiological action to 
conceptualize and synthesize the right molecules.” (Lesney, 2000)  
Biotechnology exemplifies the uncertainty about predicting what innovations lie ahead in 
health and medicine. There are now 65 drugs on the market that have emerged from 
biotechnology laboratories and 140 more in the regulatory process. In 1996, Michael Johns 
wrote: “It is difficult to overestimate how much we will know about our genome in 10-20 
years and the impact that this knowledge will have on our capacities to cure and prevent 
disease.” (Johns, 1996) In fact, however, it seems remarkably easy to overestimate the 
immediate potential of biotechnology, as repeated disappointments in attempts to apply 
genetic knowledge have shown. Indeed, many commentators now believe that big 
breakthroughs are still some way off and that, as with the discovery of the infectious nature 
of disease in the 19
th century, new knowledge about health may lead initially to non-
technological advances. In this paradigm, as Baruch Blumberg explains it: “intervention for 
prevention, and possibly treatment as well, is based not on changing the host’s genome, 
but in intervening to protect against environmental factors.” (Blumberg, 1996)  
In the absence of big breakthroughs, the less glamorous work of refining or adapting 
existing technologies may have the greatest impact on global health. Six vaccines – 
diphtheria, tetanus, whooping cough, measles, polio, TB – are included in the WHO 
expanded program on immunization (EPI), with two more – Hepatitis B and yellow fever – 
included in the so called EPI-plus. The EPI vaccines currently require 5 contacts: at birth, 6 
weeks, 10 weeks, 14 weeks and 9 months. Take-up for the final dose is particularly low – 
one reason why measles continues to take around a million lives each year. A single dose 
vaccine would clearly increase take-up considerably, while also reducing costs. 
Similarly, vaccine vial monitors (VVMs) – heat-sensitive colored discs that indicate whether 
a vaccine has exceeded a particular temperature – are a recent innovation that has been 
successful in reducing vaccine wastage resulting from the high temperatures and lack of 
consistent refrigeration facilities in parts of many developing countries. Previously 60% of 
vaccines were thrown away, because health care workers were unsure as to whether they 
were still effective (WHO 1996).    28 
Donald Stokes has referred to the concept of “strategic research,” where “informed 
judgments of research promise and societal need” are brought together. Nationally, 
governments are increasingly initiating debate in order to set just such a strategy for their 
investment in science. It seems clear, if push and pull incentives are to be used to correct 
market failures and to create new health technologies, that a similar debate is needed on a 
global level to decide what types of technologies would have the greatest impact on global 
health and what innovations seem possible within a reasonable time frame. Even the most 
basic technological road map would allow public funders to start debating and evaluating 
the relative cost effectiveness of potential big and small breakthroughs, allowing a more 
strategic approach to technological development to emerge.  
Only connect 
Health benefits can, and often have, been delivered by non-health interventions, such as 
the provision of water and sanitation, or the provision of education (Bloom and Canning, 
2000). Information technology (IT) is a new technological innovation, that is already having 
the same kind of dramatic impact, affecting: health systems and how they run; health 
professionals and how they develop their skills; medical science and how it collects, 
analyses, stores and develops knowledge; and individual patients and how they 
conceptualize and cope with health problems. In addition, it is challenging organizations of 
all kinds to innovate as well as facilitating new patterns of communication, education and 
commerce. While top-down health reform and medical innovation proceed slowly, the 
explosive bottom-up growth of information technology may have the most profound effect 
on tomorrow’s health. 
Relatively inexpensive computing facilities deliver quick and powerful benefits, from 
reducing the burden of paperwork, capturing vital evidence (supporting evidence-based 
medicine) and helping control and standardize drug inventories to promoting knowledge-
sharing – even at a great distance, for example via telemedicine. Professional health 
workers at all levels, in almost all environments, can benefit enormously from these new 
technologies. The economic benefits of such systematized knowledge, supported through 
IT, are non-trivial. For example, according to the World Bank, patients in Africa’s public 
health facilities receive benefits worth only $12 for every $100 of tax revenue spent on 
drugs.  The main sources of waste are non-competitive procurement ($27), poor storage 
and management ($19), inappropriate prescriptions ($15), poor projections of requirements 
($13), inadequate buying practices ($10) and incorrect use by patients ($3). IT could 
contribute to improvements across all these areas (World Bank, 2000). 
IT also challenges both the biomedical and the public health models, with their sharp 
divisions between professional and patient on the one hand, and individual and community   29 
on the other. In rich countries, the Internet is already bestowing new power and benefits on 
those “consumers” of health who have the education and wealth to enjoy the new 
technology. AIDS.ORG, for example, is one of many HIV/AIDS resources on the net. It 
serves 100,000 users a month, with visitors coming from 120 countries. As well as 
providing accredited training courses, it also hosts numerous discussion groups, 
demonstrating true peer-to-peer knowledge sharing. HIV/AIDS, with its history of activism in 
the USA, is perhaps the disease that has been most extensively affected by the Internet, 
but most other diseases are being discussed in one form or another. The CLL (Chronic 
Lymphatic Leukemia) group, for example, sees scores of posts a day – the vast majority 
from patients with the disease or family members. As the analysis in Appendix 2 shows, the 
discussion is highly sophisticated, with lay people able to access information that would 
previously have been unavailable even to most professionals (Bloom & River Path 
Associates, 2000).
 15  
There is, it should be said, deep ambivalence about this trend among health professionals. 
In 2000, President Mbeki of South Africa opened a major rift with the world’s scientific 
community when he questioned the link between HIV and AIDS, based on information he 
had picked up from “dissident science” websites on the web. The WHO, meanwhile, has 
recently tried to impose order on the information available by proposing to set up a “health” 
top level domain for Internet sites that had been approved for the public by WHO officials 
(approved domains would be named, for example, www.familyplanning.health). As “the 
recognized leading international agency in health, and with over 50 years’ experience in 
setting standards”, it described itself as uniquely qualified to decide what health information 
people should and should not read on the web (WHO 2000e). The Internet Corporation for 
Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN), which had received many proposals for a limited 
number of new top-level domains, rejected the proposal, without explanation. However, the 
debate about the accuracy and usefulness of Internet-based health information is certain to 
continue and will probably intensify, as more patients use web-based information to 
influence their health decisions.  
There is also the question of whether IT will further increase inequities in access to health. 
Only time will tell whether this is true, though it is noticeable that many third world towns 
that have waited years for a decent road now find Internet cafés opening in the centre of 
town. Certainly, many health professionals in developing countries are already using the 
Internet to gain access to information of a previously unavailable quality and currency. As 
Internet-use increases, health professionals will certainly have a powerful new channel for 
                                                  
15 Search engine requests for health-related issues consistently come second only to those related to sex. 
Some of the implications of this trend are explored in: David E. Bloom & River Path Associates, Social 
Capitalism & Human Diversity, published in OECD (2000), The  Creative Society of the 21st Century.    30 
health education information and the ability to contribute content that is specific to the 
country in which they work.  
Social Technology 
Technology has undoubtedly caused a revolution in health, with medical science helping 
drive astonishing reductions in mortality and morbidity. As we have argued, however, new 
technologies have not arrived in an orderly or consistent fashion. Making significant 
discoveries has proved hard; developing a discovery into a useful innovation has proved 
harder; and bringing that innovation to the widest possible market has proved hardest of all. 
Social context, economic environment, and the willingness of a society to invest in 
improving health all contribute to determining the success of a new health technology. 
Nor is technology the only way that knowledge can affect health. The public health model 
has used knowledge to affect health with minimal technology and, on occasion, 
extraordinary results. But technology has many advantages. Properly used, it brings a new 
level of reliability and standardization to the production of good health. On occasion, its 
successes have been astonishing. The abolition of smallpox, for example, was only 
possible when a simple, reliable and cheap vaccine was employed through a well 
organized, focused and widespread health initiative. 
As HIV/AIDS shows, there are clear limits to our current ability to defend global health 
standards. Most international and national institutions were unable to use knowledge about 
health to erect defenses against the disease (though some communities were able to 
protect themselves relatively effectively). Medical science has also been unable to translate 
knowledge about the disease into relevant technological developments. There have been 
breakthroughs, but of a nature only bringing benefits to a tiny minority of those affected. For 
a long period, vaccine development was almost forgotten – a failure for which both public 
and private sectors must share the blame. 
The future of global health will rely on a better understanding of the impact of knowledge on 
health, and on mechanisms that finally allow public and private sectors to work together, 
with each playing to its comparative advantage. It will require a more directed model of 
health research, one that looks to the eventual needs of the market – the many people who 
are expected to eventually benefit – both directly and indirectly – from the technology. 
Finally, it will almost certainly involve a considerable shift in the degree of responsibility 
people take for their own health. Both the biomedical and the public health models have 
tended to disempower the individual. But as with education, economic development and 
practically any human activity, without the willing participation of individuals, success will 
almost always remain elusive.   31 
The concept of “social technology” places technology at the center of the many social 
forces that mediate its use. It does not downplay the significance of a technological 
advance – especially a “magic bullet” of the power of an antibiotic. Such advances can truly 
be transformative – it is the job of  ‘social technology’ to make sure that they are.  32 
Tables 
Figure 1: Definitive Moments of Modern Medicine 
1935 Sulphonamides 
1941 Penicillin 
‘Pap’ smear for cervical cancer 
1944 Kidney  dialysis 
1946 General  anesthesia  with  curare 
1947  Radiotherapy (the linear accelerator) 
1948  Intraocular lens implant for cataracts 
1949 Cortisone 
1950  Smoking identified as the cause of lung cancer 
Tuberculosis cured with streptomycin and PAS 
1952  The Copenhagen polio epidemic and birth of intensive 
care 
Chlorpromazine in the treatment of schizophrenia 
1954  The Zeiss operating microscope 
1955 Open  Heart  surgery 
Polio vaccination 
1956 Cardiopulmonary  resuscitation 
1957  Factor VIII for hemophilia 
1959  The Hopkins endoscope 
1960 Oral  contraceptive  pill 
1961  Levodopa for Parkinson’s 
Charnley’s hip replacement 
1963 Kidney  transplant 
1964  Prevention of strokes 
Coronary bypass graft 
1967  First heart transplant 
1969  The pre-natal diagnosis of Down’s syndrome 
1970  Neonatal intensive care 
Cognitive therapy 
1971  Cure of childhood cancer 
1973 CAT  scanner 
1978  First test tube baby 
1979 Coronary  angioplasty 
1984  Helicobacter as the cause of peptic ulcer 
1987  Thrombolysis (clot-busting) for heart attacks 
1996  Triple therapy for AIDS 
1998  Viagra for the treatment of impotence 
Source: James Le Fanu (1999) The Rise & Fall of Modern 
Medicine 
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Figure 2:        Contributors to Falling Mortality Rates 
 
 
Reduction in:  Percentage contribution of gains in: 
  Income Educational level 
of adult females 
Generation and 
utilization of new 
knowledge 
Under 5 mortality rate  17 38  45 
Female adult mortality rate  20 41  39 
Male adult mortality rate  25 27  49 
Female life expectancy at birth  19 32  49 
Total fertility rate  12 58  29 
      
  Based on analysis of data from 115 low and middle income countries. 
Source: Wang J et al, Measuring country performance on health: selected indicators for 
115 countries, Washington DC, The World Bank 1999 (Human Development Network, 
Health, Nutrition and Population Series) 
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Figure 3:  
 




Source: Julius H Comroe Jr and Robert D Dripps, Scientific Basis for the Support of 
Biomedical Science, Science, Vol 192, April 9 1976, 105-111 
 
Preoperative diagnosis of cardiac defects 
Anatomic and clinical 
Physiologic: electrocardiography, other non-invasive tests 
Physiologic: cardiac catheterization 
Radiologic: selective angiocardiography 
Preoperative care and preparation 
Blood groups and typing: blood preservation; blood bank 
Nutrition 
Assessment of cardiac, pulmonary, renal, hepatic, and brain function 
Management of heart failure 
Intraoperative management 
Asepsis 
Monitoring ECG, blood pressure, heart rate, EEG, and blood O2, C O2, and 
pH 
Anesthesia and neuromuscular blocking agents 
Hypothermia and survival of ischemic organs 
Ventilation of open thorax 
Anticoagulants 
Pump-oxygenator 
Elective cardiac arrest; defibrillation 
Transfusions; fluid and electrolytes; acid-base balance 
Surgical instruments and materials 
Surgical techniques and operations 
Postoperative care 
Relief of pain 
General principals of intensive care; recording and warning systems 
Management of infection 
Diagnosis and management of circulatory failure 
Diagnosis and management of other postoperative complications 
Wound healing   35 
Appendix 1 
(Excel file, attached) 
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Appendix 2: 
 




Number of contributors  69 
Number of posts  112 
  
Posts giving latest news on 
developments in treatment of the disease 
(see below for details) 
5 
Posts giving technical advice on medical 
issues 
4 
Posts discussing possible causes of CLL  9 
Posts discussing and describing 
conventional treatment methods and 
results 
27 
Posts discussing plans and making 
arrangements for imminent meetings or 
conferences 
6 
Posts discussing alternative therapies 
such as Tea Tree Oil 
9 
Posts giving practical advice on health 
insurance and grants 
5 
Posts giving or requesting emotional 
support or advice 
48 
 
As can be seen, the level of activity on such newsgroups is frequently highly sophisticated, 
as the following news postings sharing the latest news about treatment demonstrate: 
 
30 October announcement from Human Genome Sciences (HGSI) and Dow Chemical that 
they have formed an alliance to target CLL. HGSI has developed a B-cell stimulator   
“BLYSS” treatment, and Dow Chemical has agreed to provide the capital. 
 
Dr Freda Stevenson of Southampton University, UK, is working on a vaccine designed to 
use the patient’s own immune system. Human trials are now under way after successful 
trials on mice (details of vaccine supplied). 
 
Preliminary report from University College, London, about a possible cure for arthritis, with 
possible implications for leukemia treatments. 
 
New York Times article on the discovery of a protein that stimulates B-cells to produce 
antibodies. This could aid with auto-immune diseases, immune deficiency diseases and B-
cell lymphoma. 
 
One contributor had been trading e-mails with botanist Dr James Duke, who said that ATLV 
is the virus most commonly associated with leukemia. 
 
Discussion Group Location: Association of Cancer Online Resources (ACOR) 
http://www.acor.org/.  
 
Source: Analysis, for this background paper, conducted by River Path Associates, 
http://www.riverpath.com 
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